| 1 |
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Stochastic stability in monotone economies
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Kamihigashi, T.; Stachurski, J.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 2 |
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Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
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Borgers, T.; Smith, D.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 3 |
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
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Anesi, V.; Seidmann, D.J.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 4 |
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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
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Hashimoto, T.; Hirata, D.; Kesten, O.; Kurino, M.; Unver, M.U.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 5 |
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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
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Abreu, D.; Sannikov, Y.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 6 |
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Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
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Goswami, M.P.; Mitra, M.; Sen, A.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 7 |
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
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Chen, Y.; Eraslan, H.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 8 |
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Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
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Attar, A.; Mariotti, T.; Salanie, F.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 9 |
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Persuasion and dynamic communication
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Sher, I.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 10 |
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On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
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Chambers, C.P.; Echenique, F.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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