| 1 |
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A dynamic theory of electoral competition
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Battaglini, M.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 2 |
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Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
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Peski, M.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 3 |
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Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
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Carbonell-Nicolau, O.; McLean, R.P.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 4 |
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Escaping the repugnant conclusion: Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population
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Asheim, G.B.; Zuber, S.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 5 |
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Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
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Andersson, T.; Ehlers, L.; Svensson, L.-G.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 6 |
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Second order beliefs models of choice under imprecise risk: Nonadditive second order beliefs versus nonlinear second order utility
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Giraud, R.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 7 |
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Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
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Prat, J.; Jovanovic, B.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 8 |
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Stochastic stability in monotone economies
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Kamihigashi, T.; Stachurski, J.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 9 |
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Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
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Borgers, T.; Smith, D.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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| 10 |
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
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Anesi, V.; Seidmann, D.J.
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Society for Economic Theory
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2014
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