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Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions
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Miyagawa, E.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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142 |
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Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium
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Ryan, M. J.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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143 |
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Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies
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Kibris, O.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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144 |
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Rule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection
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Juang, W.-T.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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Rent, risk, and replication. Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets
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Warneryd, K.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games
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Solan, E.; Vieille, N.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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147 |
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An Experimental Investigation of Unprofitable Games
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Morgan, J.; Sefton, M.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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148 |
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A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching
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Kosfeld, M.; Droste, E.; Voorneveld, M.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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149 |
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Stability and Segregation in Group Formation
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Milchtaich, I.; Winter, E.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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150 |
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Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency
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Kline, J. J.
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ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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2002
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