Volume 107, December 2021, issue 4

To what extent can conspiracy theories be understood as a political challenge in these pandemic times? In order to discuss this issue, I provide an explication of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ that allows it to be applied in an epistemically elucidating and politically fruitful way. Against this backdrop, I will demonstrate how conspiracy theories violate, among other things, the ethically relevant standards that are established through well-ordered political deliberation, such as standards of intersubjective justification, epistemic justice and respect. To conclude, I will show how the structural violation of these standards can lead to a rise in the number of people believing in conspiracy theories and deepens people’s mistrust of epistemic authorities.

In his doctrine of right, Kant sketched out the image of a state that secures the freedom and property of its citizens, but excludes questions of the distribution of goods. Therefore, following his basic ideas, attempts are made to incorporate socially balancing mechanisms into the theory of property. By means of some typical argumentation approaches, it is shown which paths to solve the social question are taken by Kant’s interpreters and which are closed according to the internal structural principles of Kant’s legal doctrine. With a view to Kant’s preliminary work, the concept of freedom is expanded to include a positive component of opportunities for freedom and distributive justice is interpreted as an inclusive economic, social and societal system of participatory justice.

Human dignity is commonly regarded as the fundamental moral, legal and political value. However, in philosophy and legal studies, the concept is nonetheless highly contested; in particular, it is criticised for being vague, empty, highly arbitrary, not rationally justifiable and therefore dispensable. Against this criticism, this paper defends a classical Kantian understanding of human dignity; this is done in five steps: Firstly, the concept of human dignity is clarified by distinguishing it from the concept of social dignity. Secondly, well-known attempts to justify human dignity are criticised for being insufficient, paving the way for a transcendental-philosophical justification. Thirdly, and this is the core of this paper, a transcendental-philosophical justification is presented: Starting with a broad understanding of the phenomenon of morality, the paper shows that morality has five necessary preconditions, namely the abilities of having a will, of being free, of being rational, of having a moral conscience and of being a self. As preconditions of morality, these five abilities lie beyond moral weighing and have thus to be regarded as absolute values, constituting human dignity. The paper ends - fourthly and fifthly - with a discussion of the ethical and legal consequences of this concept and with some of its difficulties.

Hans Kelsen is best known as one of the twentieth century’s leading legal theorists, advocating legal positivism by strictly separating the law from morality and other nonlegal elements. Despite the absence of a systematic and comprehensive moral theory in his writings, this paper presents and analyzes his scattered remarks on morality in metaethical terms, which should allow modern metaethics to better place his position on the broad map of metaethical theory. To this end, I will first describe Kelsen’s distinction between law and morality and then go beyond it by first discussing whether Kelsen can be regarded as a moral cognitivist or non-cognitivist, and subsequently by presenting a modest defence of his position in terms of democracy theory as well as a modern reinterpretation in the light of moral constructivism.

This article has a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it traces the earliest developments of this concept. On the other, it argues that Leonid Pitamic played a crucial role in its development. The Grundnorm was originally conceived as part of positive law, but one unable to be grasped by legal cognition, as its determination is ultimately “a political question”. Pitamic suggested that a number of important changes to this understanding, e. g. that the Grundnorm should be conceived as standing outside of legal system or placing emphasis on the principle of effectiveness or suggesting that the Grundnorm has normative import (i. e. can be considered as Sollen). His contribution, the article argues, was vital for the formulation of Kelsen’s Grundnorm, which became his signature achievement.

This article explores the common points and the differences between Hans Kelsen’s and Robert Alexy’s application theories. Although Kelsen subscribed to moral relativism and denied the idea of a practical reason, while Alexy criticised moral relativism and defended the idea of a communicative reason, it is argued that the two theories share important common features, such as denying that interpretation can point one single answer as the right one and acknowledging that interpretation is comprised by both knowledge and will. The article acknowledges that there are differences between both theories, analyses whether these differences are qualitative or quantitative and, in the end, concludes that between the two theories there is not disruption, as one might believe, but rather continuity.

The article is devoted to the historical analysis of teleological argumentation evolution in the legal interpretation. The ideas of ancient Greek and Roman orators, philosophers and lawyers, which served as the basis for development of the idea of teleological interpretation in the European legal tradition, are examined. The history of teleological interpretation method development in European legal theory from Medieval jurists to sociological legal approach of the late 19th and 20th centuries is observed, as well the existence of two main approaches in understanding the teleological method of interpretation, namely subjective-teleological and objective-teleological, is ascertained. The author states that there is a direct correlation between the concept of law and the approach to understanding of the teleological interpretation method. In conclusion, the author insists on the more progressive nature of the objective-teleological method of legal interpretation.