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WELFARE IMPLICATIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM INDETERMINACY IN A TWO-SECTOR GROWTH MODEL WITH CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES
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Chen, B.-L.; Hsu, Y.-S.; Mino, K.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 2 |
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What does it take to be a great power? The story of France joining the Big Five
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Heimann, G.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 3 |
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WHAT DRIVES IDEAS PRODUCTION ACROSS THE WORLD?
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Ang, J.B.; Madsen, J.B.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 4 |
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What Is Litigation in the World Trade Organization Worth?
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Bechtel, Michael M.; Sattler, Thomas
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 5 |
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What Next for Multilateral Trade Talks? Quantifying the Role of Negotiation Modalities
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Decreux, Y.; Fontagne, L.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 6 |
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When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework
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Bapat, N.A.; Kwon, B.R.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 7 |
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WHEN BIAS KILLS THE VARIANCE: CENTRAL LIMIT THEOREMS FOR DEA AND FDH EFFICIENCY SCORES
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Kneip, A.; Simar, L.; Wilson, P.W.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 8 |
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When is Good News About Pro-Co-operation Lobbies Good News About Co-operation?
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Chaudoin, S.; Urpelainen, J.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 9 |
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When states appease: British appeasement in the 1930s
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Trubowitz, P.; Harris, P.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 10 |
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Who Caucuses? An Experimental Approach to Institutional Design and Electoral Participation
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Karpowitz, C.F.; Pope, J.C.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 11 |
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Why do firms oppose entry-deterring policies? Environmental regulation and entry deterrence
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Espinola-Arredondo, A.; Munoz-Garcia, F.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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| 12 |
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WMD, WMD, WMD: Securitisation through ritualised incantation of ambiguous phrases
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Oren, I.; Solomon, T.
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Cambridge University Press
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2015
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